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the Supreme Court of the United States arising out of this state:  
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,1 decided over eighty years ago, and 
Employment Division v. Smith,2 decided within the last eighteen.  
While both cases were brought by religiously observant plaintiffs 
seeking relief from restrictive state measures, each carries its 
own significance for religious freedom.  Having become 
fascinated by the increasingly extensive scholarship on these 
very important cases, I thought it might be useful to explore 
curious connections between these two decisions, which lead me 
to some counterintuitive conclusions about their impact on 
religious freedom. 
I 
On June 1, 1925, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.3  The decision responded to two 
appeals brought by Walter Pierce, the Governor of Oregon, with 
respect to the validity of the Oregon Compulsory Education Act 
of 1922, a voter-passed initiative that required Oregon parents to 
send children eight through sixteen years old to public school 
and imposed fines and prison terms for noncompliance.4 
The Society of Sisters was (and still is) a religious order of 
Catholic nuns, which ran several boarding schools in Oregon, 
including St. Mary’s Academy (now day students only) and St. 
Francis School in downtown Portland.5  Fearing that the new 
Oregon law would deprive its schools of revenue and Catholic 
parents of the ability to obtain religious training for their 
children, the Society of Sisters challenged the Act in the United 
States District Court for the District of Oregon.6  There, the 
order sought to enjoin enforcement of the law by three 
defendants:  Walter Pierce, Governor of Oregon; Isaac Van 
Winkle, Attorney General of Oregon; and Stanley Myers, 
 
1 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
3 268 U.S. 510. 
4 See id. at 511. 
5 See Sister Shawn Marie Barry, The History of St. Mary’s Academy (Aug. 21, 
1991), http://www.stmaryspdx.org/about/history.htm; see also Sisters of the Holy 
Names, Oregon, About Us, http://www.sistersoftheholynames.org/oregon/about/ 
index.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008). 
6 See Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary v. Pierce, 296 F. 928, 
930–31 (D. Or. 1924), aff’d, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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District Attorney for Multnomah County.7  Arguing before a 
special three-judge panel, the religious order claimed that the 
law violated both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Contracts Clause, and sought an 
injunction.8  Consolidating the case with a challenge to the Act 
brought by the Salem, Oregon-based Hill Military Academy, a 
private nonreligiously affiliated school, the three-judge district 
court unanimously enjoined the Oregon statute on the grounds 
that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment.9  The Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that the Act violated the “liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control.”10 
A. 
Public perceptions have cast the Pierce decision as a victory 
for religious liberty, and many academics encourage this view.  
Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School writes that “what 
Pierce ultimately represents is the judgment that in order to take 
religious freedom seriously, we must take the ability of parents 
to raise their children in their religion seriously.”11 
The Society of Sisters made an explicit argument for religious 
freedom in its bill of complaint, stating that “said pretended law 
attempts to control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious 
opinions and to interfere with the rights of conscience.”12  But, 
interestingly, the Society did not explicitly invoke the federal 
Free Exercise Clause, for that clause would not be incorporated 
against the states until 1940.13  The Society instead claimed that 
the Oregon Compulsory Education Act deprived it of liberty 
 
7 See id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 938. 
10 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 510, 534–35 (1925). 
11 Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools:  Reflections on Pierce, 70 
Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1205 (1997). 
12 Transcript of Record, Pierce, 296 F. 928 (No. 583), reprinted in OREGON 
SCHOOL CASES:  COMPLETE RECORD 25 (1925) [hereinafter Transcript, Pierce I]. 
13 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  The Society of Sisters did 
invoke a similar clause in Section 3 of Article I of the Oregon Constitution, 
Transcript, Pierce I, supra note 12, which states:  “No law shall in any case whatever 
control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the 
rights of conscience.”   OR. CONST. art. I, § 3, reprinted in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, 
supra note 12, at 702. 
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without due process of law as applied to the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.14  This argument turned upon the 
freedom of parents to send their children to private schools, such 
as St. Mary’s, which offered religious training as well as general 
education. 
The district court had enjoined the Act based upon the 
schools’ rights to economic liberty and substantive due process.15  
Citing Lochner v. New York,16 Murphy v. California,17 and Meyer 
v. Nebraska,18 District Judge Wolverton wrote for the three-
judge district court: 
 The right to contract in relation to one’s business is a liberty 
that may not be inhibited without entrenchment upon rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The right to 
engage in a useful, legitimate business, not harmful or vicious, 
is protected under the amendment, and cannot be     
abrogated. . . . 
 . . . . 
 It cannot be successfully combated that parochial and 
private schools have existed almost from time immemorial–so 
long, at least, that their privilege and right to teach the 
grammar grades must be regarded as natural and inherent, as 
much so as the privilege and right of a tutor to teach the 
German language with the grammar grades, as was held in 
Meyer v. Nebraska.  The absolute right of these schools to 
teach in the grammar grades . . . and the right of the parents to 
engage them to instruct their children, we think, is within the 
liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment.
19
 
Although the district court styled this right as part of the 
“liberty” component, its decision was grounded essentially in the 
schools’ property rights to patronage.  Despite the strong 
interest in religious education at stake, the court did not discuss 
religious liberty at all.  Instead, the court granted relief on the 
same grounds to both the Society of Sisters and Hill Military 
Academy, holding that the Oregon Compulsory Education Act 
deprived all such schools of property without due process of law 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
 
14 Transcript, Pierce I, supra note 12, at 25. 
15 See Pierce, 296 F. at 936–38. 
16 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
17 225 U.S. 623 (1912). 
18 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
19 Pierce, 296 F. at 936–37 (citations omitted). 
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Constitution.20  The court expressly rejected the Society of 
Sisters’ Privileges and Immunities Clause argument, concluding 
that the clause did not protect businesses such as schools.21  As 
an aside, I should add that I feel some affinity with this panel 
because it included a late member of my own court, United 
States Circuit Judge William Ball Gilbert, sitting by designation, 
who was the first Oregonian to be appointed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
B. 
The state defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court 
of the United States.22  Governor Pierce emphasized in his 
Supreme Court brief that “after arguing the case mainly on the 
question of the deprivation of liberty without due process of law 
. . . [the judges] decide[d] the case solely on the question of the 
deprivation of property without due process of law.”23  Rather 
than defend the precise reasoning of the district court, however, 
the Society of Sisters responded that both a property right and a 
liberty interest were at stake.24  The Society carefully pointed out 
that there were strong religious interests at stake but that it 
expected the Court to “sit[] in impartial judgment . . . upon all 
faiths and creeds.”25 
I mentioned that the Society did not ask the Court to rule 
based upon the Free Exercise Clause, which had not yet been 
incorporated against the states.  Fascinatingly, it was the Oregon 
Attorney General, Isaac Van Winkle, in his separate appellate 
brief, who expressly raised the possibility that the Supreme 
Court might incorporate the clause so as to support the Society 
of Sisters’ claims.26  Vehemently arguing that the federal Free 
Exercise Clause did not protect against state laws indirectly 
limiting religious liberty, the Attorney General declared:  “The 
 
20 See id. at 937–38. 
21 Id. at 931. 
22 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 511 (1925). 
23 Brief of Appellant, Governor of Oregon, Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (No. 583), 
reprinted in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 12, at 106. 
24 See Transcript of Record, Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (No. 583), reprinted in OREGON 
SCHOOL CASES, supra note 12, at 663 [hereinafter Transcript, Pierce II]. 
25 Id. at 669. 
26 See Brief of Appellant, Isaac H. Van Winkle, Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (No. 583), 
reprinted in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 12, at 168. 
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books are full of cases in which the contention has been 
advanced that the religious convictions of a party have required 
him to break the law, and . . . that the laws in question are 
[therefore] unconstitutional.  The courts have everywhere 
refused to uphold this contention.”27 
Attorney General Van Winkle pointed to the Court’s decision 
in Reynolds v. United States,28 which ruled that Mormon 
believers had no First Amendment right to constitutional 
exemption from antipolygamy laws.29  The Reynolds Court had 
explained:  “To permit this would be to make the professed 
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and 
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.  
Government could exist only in name under such 
circumstances.”30  The Governor argued that Reynolds and other 
precedent required the Court to uphold Oregon’s law, which the 
State viewed as a legitimate requirement that “all immigrants 
admitted to all the advantages and opportunities of life in the 
United States . . . be taught by the state the English language, 
and the character of American institutions and government.”31 
In its oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Society of 
Sisters thereupon seized the opportunity to make a not-so-subtle 
claim that the Oregon law was motivated by anti-Catholic 
animus.32  Pointing out that “the question of religious liberty 
[was] thrust into the case for the first time by the briefs filed on 
behalf of the Attorney General and the Governor of the State,” 
the Society essentially argued that the government’s briefs 
constituted an admission regarding the purpose of the law.33  The 
Society asserted that the state’s briefs revealed that the 
“underlying motive and the immediate intent and purpose of this 
measure were anti-religious and to prevent religious instruction 
to children.”34  The law, the Society continued, was as bad as 
“any atheistic or sovietic measure ever adopted in Russia”35 and 
 
27 Id. 
28 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
29 Brief of Appellant, Isaac H. Van Winkle, supra note 26, at 168–69. 
30 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167. 
31 Brief of Appellant, Governor of Oregon, supra note 23, at 98. 
32 Transcript, Pierce II, supra note 24, at 669. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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sought to “destroy[] the right to religious liberty and freedom of 
education in the name, in the cant, on the pretense of 
Americanization.”36 
This claim was not surprising in light of the public perceptions 
of the law.  Indeed, reports in the local Morning Oregonian 
newspaper commented that “[a]ccusations that the law was 
backed by the Ku Klux Klan and was aimed at the Roman 
Catholic church have been heard on every side since the statute 
was put on Oregon’s books.”37  And evidence demonstrates that 
the most active supporters of the ballot initiative indeed were 
members of the KKK, who placed a similar compulsory 
education measure on the ballot in Washington state in 1924–
after the Oregon district court’s decision but before the Supreme 
Court rendered the final word on such laws.38  The anti-Catholic 
innuendos also came through in the Governor’s and Attorney 
General’s briefs, which were laced with complaints about the 
lack of proper immigrant assimilation at a time when many 
immigrants were Catholic.39 
Yet the Supreme Court declined to rule on religious liberty 
grounds.  Not only did the Court fail to read the Free Exercise 
Clause as offering protection against state laws, but the Court 
did not specify that the “liberty interest” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was a religious one.  Instead, the Court struck down 
the law based upon the personal “liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control.”40  Thus the Court shifted away from the 
economic basis of the district court’s decision and did not even 
reference the religious liberty arguments presented by both 
 
36 Id. at 671. 
37 Charles C. Hart, U.S. Court Voids School Statute, MORNING OREGONIAN, 
June 2, 1925, at 1. 
38 Paula Abrams, The Little Red Schoolhouse:  Pierce, State Monopoly of 
Education and the Politics of Intolerance, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 61, 67 nn.31–32 
(2003); see David Norberg, Ku Klux Klan in the Valley:  A 1920s Phenomena, 
WHITE RIVER J. (White River Valley Museum, Auburn, Wa.), Jan. 2004, at 2, 5–6, 
available at http://www.wrvmuseum.org/journal/journal_0104.htm. 
39 E.g., Brief of Appellant, Governor of Oregon, supra note 23, at 98 (“The 
voters of Oregon might have felt that the mingling together, during a portion of 
their education, of the children of all races and sects might be the best safeguard 
against future internal dissensions with the consequent weakening of the 
community against foreign dangers.” (emphasis added)). 
40 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 642 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 635 
parties, choosing instead to articulate a form of parental liberty 
unconnected to economic or religious interests. 
By grounding its decision in a non-religious-based parental 
right derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
enabled the Hill Military Academy to emerge victorious in 
tandem with the Society of Sisters.  And the holding meant 
victory to many more claimants than those at bar, for it heralded 
a substantive due process legacy that continues to unfold–with 
direct and indirect consequences for religious freedom. 
C. 
In the decades to come, this substantive due process reasoning 
would spawn consequences that undermined many of the 
traditional values held dear by adherents of religion.  While the 
immediate result of Pierce was to preserve the rights of parents 
to send their children to private religious schools, Pierce soon 
was cited in support of the far less traditional rights of 
contraception, abortion, and sodomy.  These three “rights” 
would not only be deeply confounding to the order of nuns who 
brought the case, but to many others who hold similar values and 
care about religious freedom. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court articulated an expansive 
right to privacy based in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and the emanations and penumbras of the Bill of 
Rights.41  The Court expressly invoked Pierce for precedential 
support, reading the case to stand for religious liberty under the 
First Amendment as well as due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.42  The Griswold Court did not limit the 
Pierce decision to parental rights, nor did it appear to notice that 
Pierce did not cite the First Amendment at all.  The Griswold 
Court’s citation to Pierce made clear that the latter would be 
used by the Court as an increasingly flexible tool to expand 
personal liberties beyond those defined by the constitutional 
text. 
This point became all the more evident in Roe v. Wade,43 
when the Court widened the reasoning in Pierce to include a 
right to abortion.  In discussing what it called “the roots” of “this 
 
41 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
42 Id. at 481–83. 
43 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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guarantee of personal privacy,” the Court noted that Pierce had 
established the right in the realm of “child rearing and 
education.”44  When the Court reaffirmed Roe fifteen years later 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, it 
invoked the case law supporting substantive due process and 
cited Pierce as one of the first decisions demonstrating “an 
aspect of liberty [to be] protected against state interference by 
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.”45 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a state ban on 
sodomy, concluding that the ban conflicted with the Court’s 
“broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the 
Due Process Clause in earlier cases, including Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters.”46  Again, Pierce provided the Court with crucial support 
for a substantive due process decision that left many advocates 
of traditional religious values very much perplexed. 
By providing an extratextual ground for constitutional 
freedom in the context of private religious education, Pierce 
profoundly affected the methodology of the Court and the 
trajectory of the law.  That seminal case has paved the way for 
new interpretations of the personal liberty guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the particular rights accorded to 
members of the human family vis-à-vis one another and vis-à-vis 
the state.  These changes have affected a realm in which religion 
has long played a predominant role in inculcating values and 
practices.  And, in time, these legal changes appear to have 
taken on a moral stature of their own:  the frequent coincidence 
of moral and legal commands–such as those against murder, 
theft, and perjury–leads many to presume the law to carry both 
juridical and normative weight.  Today, persons adhering to 
traditional faith-based teachings might have good reason to be 
less sanguine about that 1925 victory in Oregon. 
II 
In the decades following Pierce, the Supreme Court made 
jurisprudential changes that would alter the way it approached 
religious liberty claims.  In the 1940 decision Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, the Court, perhaps inevitably after Gitlow v. New 
 
44 Id. at 152–53. 
45 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992). 
46 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
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York,47 incorporated the Free Exercise Clause against the 
states.48  In the 1963 decision Sherbert v. Verner, the Court 
articulated the now-familiar free exercise test that barred states 
from infringing on free exercise in the absence of a compelling 
state interest.49  In Sherbert, the state had refused to provide 
unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist who 
had been fired for refusal to work on a Saturday, the Sabbath 
day of her faith.50  The Court held that the state was required to 
provide an exemption to the rule in order to avoid forcing a 
religious adherent to “abandon his religious convictions” in 
order to retain his livelihood.51  “‘To deny an exemption . . . 
[would be] in effect to penalize’” the exercise of religious liberty, 
the Court concluded.52  The Sherbert decision became the core 
basis for claims of religious exemption from neutral and 
generally applicable laws. 
A. 
But in 1990, another Oregon case would once again determine 
the scope of religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause, 
and in a most unanticipated way.  In Employment Division v. 
Smith, two religious claimants sued the State of Oregon for 
denial of unemployment benefits.53  Alfred Smith and Galen 
Black had “ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a 
ceremony of the Native American Church,” and as a result, had 
 
47 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  In Gitlow, the Court considered the validity of the 
statutory penalization of “criminal anarchy” under New York Penal Law §§ 160–
161.  Id. at 654.  Gitlow had been convicted of such crime and raised facial and as-
applied challenges to the law based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See id. at 664.  Although ultimately affirming Gitlow’s conviction, the 
Court stated: 
For present  purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and 
of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress–are among the fundamental personal rights and 
“liberties” protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States. 
Id. at 666. 
48 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
49 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
50 Id. at 399–400. 
51 Id. at 410. 
52 Id. at 406 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)). 
53 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
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been fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation 
organization.54  Although the two men were not criminally 
prosecuted for their drug use, Oregon denied them 
unemployment benefits because they had been fired for “work-
related ‘misconduct.’”55 
Citing Sherbert, Smith and Black argued that the Free 
Exercise Clause required an exemption from the general rule.56  
They argued that the state’s interest in “preserv[ing] the 
financial integrity of the [unemployment] compensation fund” 
did not constitute a compelling reason to infringe on free 
exercise.57  They asserted that the relevant consideration could 
not be the state’s much more important interest in enforcing its 
criminal laws, because they had not been prosecuted.58 
Although successful in the Supreme Court of Oregon, the 
claimants failed to persuade the Supreme Court of the United 
States, where then Attorney General of Oregon David 
Frohnmayer (now President of the University of Oregon) 
personally argued the state’s case and prevailed.59  In a 5-4 
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected Smith and 
Black’s free exercise claims.60  The opinion’s legal analysis began 
with the text of the Free Exercise Clause.61  Although Justice 
Scalia conceded that “no case of ours has involved the point,” he 
stated “[i]t would doubtless be unconstitutional” for the 
government to ban “acts or abstentions only when they are 
engaged in for religious reasons.”62  On the other hand, Justice 
Scalia found the clause ambiguous as to whether “‘prohibiting 
the free exercise [of religion]’ includes requiring any individual 
to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) 
the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or 
requires).”63  Without any reference to the history of the clause, 
Justice Scalia wrote that “it is a permissible reading of the text     
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 875. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. at 873. 
60 Id. at 890. 
61 Id. at 877. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 878 (alteration in original). 
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. . . to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the 
object . . . but merely the incidental effect . . . the First 
Amendment has not been offended.”64  Characteristically, 
Justice Scalia went on to ensure that this reading was not only 
permissible but correct.  Uncharacteristically, he looked solely to 
precedent–without considering the original meaning and 
history of the clause–to make this determination. 
The Smith Court invoked Reynolds v. United States65 as the 
first occasion the Court had to assert the rule that 
“‘[c]onscientious scruples . . . [do not] relieve[] the individual 
from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or 
restriction of religious beliefs.’”66  That was precisely the 
argument made, and the case cited, by the Attorney General of 
Oregon in Pierce, when he argued that religious liberty did not 
justify overturning the Compulsory Education Act.67  The Court 
had declined to discuss the matter in its Pierce opinion, but it 
met the argument head-on in Smith.  Quoting Reynolds, Justice 
Scalia reiterated: 
“Laws” . . . “are made for the government of actions, and while 
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, 
they may with practices. . . . Can a man excuse his practices to 
the contrary because of his religious belief?  To permit this 
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every 
citizen to become a law unto himself.”
68
 
Justice Scalia made clear that the argument for 
nonexemption–ignored by the Court in Pierce–was dispositive 
in Smith.  He stated:  “There being no contention that Oregon’s 
drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the 
communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s 
children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever 
since Reynolds plainly controls.”69 
But the application of Reynolds was less likely in 1990 than it 
would have been in 1925, due to the interposition of Sherbert’s 
 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
66 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 
310 U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940)). 
67 See supra pp. 639–40. 
68 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166–67). 
69 Id. at 882. 
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compelling interest test.  Recognizing that Sherbert could be 
read to require religious exemptions based on free exercise, 
Justice Scalia meticulously distinguished the case.  Although 
acknowledging that Sherbert addressed “the denial of 
unemployment benefits,”70 he concluded that the case was 
different in crucial ways.  Most importantly, Smith and Black 
had violated a criminal law, whereas “the conduct at issue in 
[Sherbert] was not prohibited by law.”71  And Justice Scalia 
pointed out that Sherbert had only limited significance for 
religious liberty even outside the realm of unemployment 
benefits, because “[a]lthough we have sometimes purported to 
apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than [the denial of 
unemployment benefits], we have always found the test 
satisfied.”72 
B. 
Justice Scalia’s decision not to address the history of the Free 
Exercise Clause or its original meaning has been assailed by 
scholars like my fellow United States Circuit Judge Michael 
McConnell of the Tenth Circuit, who believe that the clause 
envisioned legal exemptions in cases where religious liberty 
could not be reconciled with civil laws.73  Even though other 
scholars, such as Professors Michael Malbin and Ellis West, 
appear to offer different, and perhaps more persuasive, 
arguments to the contrary,74 Justice Scalia engaged none of 
them. 
I suggest that the Smith opinion’s failure to enlist historical 
analysis to support its decision weakens it considerably.  What is 
most surprising is that Justice Scalia did not offer any of the 
compelling arguments made by scholars like Malbin and West, 
and later built upon by Professor Philip Hamburger of Columbia 
 
70 Id. at 883. 
71 Id. at 876. 
72 Id. at 883. 
73 Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1137–41 (1990). 
74 MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS 39–40 (1978); Ellis West, The 
Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 591, 624 (1990). 
 648 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 635 
Law School,75 despite the fact that such arguments would have 
considerably strengthened Smith in the eyes of many jurists, who 
were appalled by the decision’s impact on religious liberty.  
Attention to history and original meaning might at least have 
placated those who despaired over the dim prospects Smith left 
for claims of religious freedom.  Some critics would view the 
decision as an anomaly for a justice known to decry other 
established precedents–such as Roe v. Wade–in favor of a 
more careful reading of the constitutional text.  Many have 
wondered why the conservative jurist, normally so attentive to 
tradition and original meaning, would author a decision cutting 
back on religious freedom. 
The answer, and a reasonable one at that, appears to lie in 
Justice Scalia’s conviction that the courts have limited 
competence and must remain above the religious fray.  In 
addition to citing precedent, Justice Scalia’s Smith opinion 
presents a pragmatic and structural argument for a narrow 
reading of the Free Exercise Clause.  He argues that “courts 
must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in 
a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim,”76 for evaluating 
such matters in objective terms would prove “utterly 
unworkable.”77  Requiring religious exemptions in some cases 
but not others would authorize judges to make impermissible 
value judgments and would raise “the prospect of 
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic 
obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”78  Anarchy and 
arbitrariness, in short. 
This was neither the first nor the last time Justice Scalia would 
argue that such matters could not be determined by the courts in 
a principled manner.  Ten years after authoring Smith, Justice 
Scalia wrote in a case involving the parental right originally 
articulated in Pierce.  In that case, Troxel v. Granville, the 
majority rejected a visitation-rights claim made by two 
 
75 See generally Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious 
Exemption:  An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992) (using a 
historical analysis to argue that the First Amendment was not intended to grant 
broad religious exemptions from civil laws). 
76 Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. 
77 Id. at 887 n.4. 
78 Id. at 888. 
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grandparents.79  Citing Pierce, the Court stated that “the ‘liberty 
of parents and guardians’ includes the right ‘to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control.’”80  
The mother, therefore, could deny the grandparents access to 
her child.81 
Justice Scalia, in a powerful dissent, assailed the substantive 
due process reasoning of the majority and argued that the 
“theory of unenumerated parental rights . . . has small claim to 
stare decisis protection.”82  But he conceded his own belief that 
“a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is 
among the ‘unalienable Rights’ with which the Declaration of 
Independence proclaims ‘all men . . . are endowed by their 
Creator,’” and suggested that this right was “among the ‘othe[r] 
[rights] retained by the people’ which the Ninth Amendment 
says the Constitution’s enumeration of rights ‘shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage.’”83 
But of utmost importance, Justice Scalia finds the competence 
to define such a right to rest in the legislative and not the judicial 
branch.  While it would be “entirely compatible with the 
commitment to representative democracy set forth in the 
founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in 
electoral campaigns, that the State has no power to interfere 
with parents’ authority over the rearing of their children,” he 
had no power as a judge “to deny legal effect to laws that (in 
[his] view) infringe upon what is (in [his] view) that 
unenumerated right.”84  Justice Scalia’s Troxel dissent may give 
context to his approach in Smith.  If Smith is viewed as a part of 
Justice Scalia’s larger efforts to rein in what he views as the 
lawlessness of substantive due process (particularly as defined in 
the abortion context), his Smith decision may appear more 
palatable to advocates of traditional religious values.  This 
argument suggests that the Smith decision, like his Troxel 
dissent, can be read as a consistent approach to the Constitution 
after all. 
 
79 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). 
80 Id. at 65 (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)). 
81 See id. at 75. 
82 Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 91. 
84 Id. at 91–92. 
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But in a fascinating twist, the Smith decision appears to place 
increased emphasis on the role of substantive due process in 
vindicating religious freedom.  For the Smith decision makes 
clear that an observant claimant will not win a free exercise 
exemption from a neutral and generally applicable law unless he 
or she can show an impermissible legislative intent to 
discriminate against religion or otherwise invoke substantive due 
process.  Justice Scalia’s Smith opinion acknowledges in a 
remarkable way the doctrinal stature of substantive due process, 
and seems even to increase its importance for religious claims by 
stating: 
 The only decisions in which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable 
law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free 
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as 
freedom of speech and of the press,
85
 or the right of parents, 
acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, to direct the 
education of their children.
86
 
In other words, Smith makes clear that only substantive due 
process could support religious exemptions from the law that 
state legislatures did not choose to provide.  This ruling leaves 
the Cantwell door open but means that few religious claims for 
exemption can cross its threshold.  And if the Roberts Court 
 
85 Here the Court cited Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).  
The suggestion that free exercise claims, which alone would fail, could succeed if 
framed “in conjunction with other constitutional protections,” Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990), has generated considerable debate.  Eight years 
ago, I discussed the unusual character of such rights on behalf of a panel of my 
court.  See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 
1999) (applying strict scrutiny to claims of violations of the “hybrid rights” of free 
exercise and free speech), withdrawn and superseded by 220 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (deeming the claims unripe for review).  Academics have 
continued the analysis.  See, e.g., Kyle Still, Comment, Smith’s Hybrid Rights 
Doctrine and the Pierce Right:  An Unintelligent Design, 85 N.C. L. REV. 385, 409 
(2006) (quoting the three-judge opinion in Thomas:  “‘Perhaps not surprisingly in 
view of the Supreme Court’s rather cryptic explanations, the courts of appeals have 
struggled to decipher Smith’s hybrid-rights formula and have reached divergent 
conclusions as to exactly what constitutes a hybrid-rights claim.’” (quoting Thomas, 
165 F.3d at 703)); see also Bradley L. Davis, Comment, Compelled Expression of the 
Religiously Forbidden:  Pharmacists, “Duty to Fill” Statutes, and the Hybrid Rights 
Exception, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 97, 109–19 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of 
hybrid rights theory in Thomas, 165 F.3d at 730). 
86 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
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follows the admonitions of its conservative justices and continues 
its slow retreat from substantive due process, religious 
practitioners may have even narrower grounds on which to base 
their claims. 
III 
So where does that leave us?  I suggest that as a result of its 
narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause, Smith ensures, for 
better or worse, that religious liberty will depend largely on 
legislative action and less on judicial protection.  Analysis of 
demographic trends adds interest to the jurisprudential shift; for 
the religious views of voting citizens, and their connections to 
established churches, have changed considerably since the time 
of the founding and even more so since Pierce.  In 1925, religious 
liberty was attacked by a law passed on the initiative of a 
sectarian, anti-Catholic majority.  Today, a growing percent of 
Americans associate with no organized religion at all.87  In recent 
decades, West Coast states have led a trend away from 
established churches, and Oregon has often appeared at the 
helm.88 
What do trends toward secularization and religious 
individualism mean for religious liberty after Smith?  I discern 
three primary concerns.  First, restrictive laws may be passed 
with the purpose of inhibiting religion.  Fortunately, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that, even after Smith, “[t]he 
Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility 
which is masked as well as overt,” and “[o]fficial action that 
targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be 
shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial 
neutrality.”89 
Second, and perhaps more troubling, restrictive laws may be 
enacted–or simply enforced–out of sheer insensitivity to 
religion.  This may be a special concern in a time of increasing 
secularism and preoccupation with self-centered and temporal 
 
87 See Cathy Lynn Grossman, Charting the Unchurched in America, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 7, 2002, at 1D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/2002/2002-
03-07-no-religion.htm. 
88 See id. 
89 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 
(1993). 
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pursuits.  Third, even if the legislatures are willing to pass laws to 
protect religious practices, there is a significant risk that such 
statutes may be ruled unconstitutional by the courts.  This last 
concern suggests that advocates of religious freedom may be 
caught between a rock and a hard place, as both courts and 
legislatures lose the ability to grant them shelter. 
A. 
Restrictions on faith-based activities will not affect only 
members of the Catholic Church, as in Pierce, or the Native 
American Church, as in Smith.  A look at current free exercise 
conundrums shows that practices of diverse faiths may be 
endangered.  Will Muslim women be forced to strip their heads 
of traditional garb required by their faith?  France has required 
as much, and while it has far outpaced even Oregon in its 
secularization, we may not be that far behind. 
B. 
But we need not look abroad to see how law has already 
limited the practices of various religious persons and 
organizations.  Recently, several pharmacists in Illinois were 
fired from their jobs for refusing on religious grounds to comply 
with state rules requiring them to distribute the morning-after 
pill.90  They filed suit in federal district court, citing the Free 
Exercise Clause.91  The judge denied the state’s motion to 
dismiss, allowing the pharmacists to proceed on their claim that 
the state rules were motivated by antireligious animus.92  On 
October 9, 2007, the plaintiffs reached a compromise with the 
state and dropped the suit.93 
In Massachusetts, state antidiscrimination laws have been 
enforced without an exception that would allow Catholic 
adoption agencies to give children only to heterosexual 
 
90 Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (C.D. Ill. 2006). 
91 Id. at 999. 
92 Id. at 1005. 
93 Agreed Joint Motion of Plaintiff Walgreen Co. and Defendants to Stay Case, 
Menges, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992 (No. 05-3307).  Of considerable interest, the House 
recently passed the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th 
Cong. § 1 (2007).  The purpose of the act is to prohibit “employment discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.”  Id. at § 2(1).  Currently, the proposed 
legislation contains an exemption for religious organizations.  Id. at § 6. 
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couples.94  As a result, the Catholic Church has concluded that it 
could not reconcile the practice with its faith and withdrew from 
providing adoption services altogether.95  The Anglican, 
Catholic, and Lutheran churches may face other conflicts as well:  
will prosecutors begin to press charges for violations of underage 
drinking laws, when minors receive communion in both species 
(bread and wine) at daily liturgies? 
Antidiscrimination laws protecting women from employment 
harassment might also be applied to force churches with male 
clergies to hire female pastors or priests.  And evidentiary rules 
might be enacted that would apply to all persons, without 
exemptions for priest-penitent communications.96  While such 
laws might serve otherwise worthy purposes and be enacted 
without any intention of restricting religious freedom, they might 
be read in ways that would severely constrain faith-related 
practices. 
As I have emphasized before, these concerns do not affect 
one church or a single faith.  The anti-Catholic sentiments that 
prevailed in Oregon in 1925 have been subsumed by indifference 
 
94 See Steve LeBlanc, Catholic Charities to Halt Adoptions over Issue Involving 
Gays, BOSTON.COM, Mar. 10, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/local/ 
massachusetts/articles/2006/03/10/catholic_charities_to_halt_adoptions_over_issue 
_involving_gays/. 
95 See id. 
96 All fifty states provide such a privilege, though they differ as to which person 
can waive the protection.  See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2 (5th ed. 1999).  
In Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that the taping of a prison inmate’s confession violated the inmate’s rights under the 
Fourth Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  Id. at 1534.  
Writing for the court, Judge Noonan noted that the inmate’s expectation of privacy 
in his communications with his confessor, Father Mockaitus, was reasonable:  
“[T]he history of the nation has shown a uniform respect for the character of 
sacramental confession as inviolable by government agents interested in securing 
evidence of crime from the lips of [a] criminal.”  Id. at 1532.  By taping the 
confession, the government violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 1534.  Judge 
Noonan also concluded that taping the confession violated the provisions of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act that barred government from “‘substantially 
burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion’” unless acting “‘in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest’” and using “‘the least restrictive means.’”  Id. at 
1528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994)).  Judge Noonan’s opinion rejected 
constitutional and statutory challenges to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
concluding that Congress had full authority to enact such protective legislation.  Id. 
at 1529–30.  But less than half a year later, the Supreme Court disagreed, and struck 
down the statute.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).  It would 
appear that the priest-penitent privilege continues to enjoy Fourth Amendment 
protection, however. 
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and hostility toward other faiths as well.  And while Pierce 
ensured that private schools, including religious ones, retained a 
right to exist, such schools may face new threats.  For example, 
could antidiscrimination laws be invoked to require Jewish, 
Amish, Muslim, and other religious communities to hire 
nonbelievers to teach in their schools? 
Smith does not offer much hope for exemptions from state 
antidiscrimination laws.  It would be ironic–though certainly 
possible–for courts to find a discriminatory purpose behind 
such laws.  But without proof of such purpose, or the aid of 
another constitutional right, religious claims for relief would fail.  
As these examples show, persons who care about freedom and 
faith must keep a watchful eye for animus.  They must, however, 
turn their primary efforts to persuasion, so that their fellow 
citizens and their legislators can share their concerns and reach 
appropriate accommodations. 
C. 
Unfortunately, as already mentioned, a third impediment to 
religious freedom may arise in the context of legislative action: 
statutes designed to protect faith-based practices may be deemed 
unconstitutional.  For example, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the 
Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, in which Congress had sought to 
provide greater protection for free exercise.97  The Act rejected 
the limitations on free exercise allowed by the Court’s opinion in 
Smith, and required federal courts to apply the more protective 
Sherbert test98 when analyzing religious claims.99  In City of 
Boerne, the Court rejected Congress’s attempt to protect 
religious freedom, ruling that the Act exceeded the scope of 
congressional authority.100  The Court emphasized that Congress 
may not “enact legislation that expands the rights [enumerated 
 
97 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
98 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see supra Part II. 
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994), invalidated by City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
100 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
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in the Constitution],”101 or “define its own powers by altering the 
[Constitution’s] meaning.”102 
Thus, the Court’s decision in City of Boerne undercut the 
assurance it had given in Smith that legislative action could 
protect free exercise.  In Smith the Court had presented 
structural arguments emphasizing that legislatures could decide 
whether to expand religious freedom; in City of Boerne the 
Court applied structural arguments to cabin Congress’s 
competence to do just that.  While both decisions may be 
defended for their fidelity to the separation of powers, their 
interplay suggests yet a further hurdle for advocates of religious 
freedom. 
The troubling interplay of the Court’s free exercise decisions 
and its ruling in City of Boerne were noted in a dissent to that 
decision.  There, Justice Souter expressed reluctance to limit 
Congress’s power to protect religious freedom and urged the 
Court to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted.103  He argued that Smith should not be applied to strike 
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act without closer 
analysis of the claims and “the historical arguments going to the 
original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause . . . which 
raise[] very substantial issues about the soundness of the Smith 
rule.”104  Justice Souter’s concerns did not sway the majority, but 
his dissent underscored the problems for religious freedom that 
arise from the intersection of the Court’s decisions.105 
 
101 Id. at 527–28. 
102 Id. at 529. 
103 Id. at 565–66 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
104 Id. at 565 (emphasis added). 
105 Justice Scalia concurred in the majority decision in City of Boerne, with the 
exception of Subsection III-A-1, in which the Court discussed the legislative history 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 509; id. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring).  On 
the other hand, he had vehemently dissented in an earlier case in which the Court 
invalidated legislative protections of religious exercise.  See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In Texas Monthly, the 
Supreme Court had struck down a statute exempting religious periodicals from 
sales tax.  Id. at 25 (majority opinion).  The Court ruled that the statute violated the 
Establishment Clause and was not mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.  See id.  
Justice Scalia disagreed.  Id. at 29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He noted the long history 
of state statutes providing such tax exemptions, and added:  “In practice, a similar 
exemption may well exist in even more States than that, since until today our case 
law has suggested that [the exemption] is not only permissible but perhaps 
required.”  Id. at 30–31 (emphasis added).  Of course, it is ironic that Justice Scalia, 
author of Smith, would suggest that exemptions from generally applicable tax laws 
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IV 
The future of religious freedom may now shift to the hands of 
voters and lawmakers.  Although the courts can continue to 
protect religious practices against laws motivated by 
discriminatory purposes, or grant relief when Free Exercise 
claims are made “in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections,” most protective action must be legislative. 
Believers must learn to attract the support of legislators–a 
task that may well become more difficult as secularism grows in 
the voting population.  But at least the responsibility of pursuing 
religious liberty rests with those most committed to its 
preservation.  If believers raise their voices, I have no doubt that 
they will be heard and will eventually prevail in what is, deep 
down, a tolerant and respectful society, such that their faiths and 
freedoms will be protected in a nation built upon those values.  
For despite trends toward secularization, most Americans 
continue to profess religious faith, which, I suggest, enables them 
to understand the importance of faith-based practices and the 
value of accommodation.  As American society and law remain 
grounded in moral norms and faith-based traditions, those 
asserting claims grounded in religious freedom may strike 
sympathetic chords.  But to strike such chords, they first must 
speak.  Only by the energy and perseverance of their voices can 
our nation retain in its fullest form the freedom for which it was 
designed. 
 
 
 
were “perhaps required” by prior Supreme Court precedent, but the Texas Monthly 
dissent certainly accords with his view that legislatures can provide, and have 
traditionally provided, solicitude for free exercise. 
